Extension of Lease Contract in Egyptian Law
The lease contract of a residential property with a family nature is a contract in which the tenant contracts to reside in it with his family members and whoever he deems fit to accommodate them.
Upon the death of the tenant or his leaving the property, the contract is extended in favor of his wife, children, or parents residing with him, for a stable residence. Article 29, Law no. 49 of 1977 applies this rule regardless of whether the deceased or the leaving party was an original tenant or whether the contract was extended by law in their favor.

The ruling of unconstitutionality of Article 29/3, Law no. 49 of 1977, as long as it does not include a provision for the termination of the lease contract, which the lessor is obligated to release to those entitled to occupy the property upon the end of their residence in it, whether by death or leaving. Its impact is that the heirs of the original tenant fulfill the conditions stipulated in Article 1/1, Law no. 6 of 1997. Its impact is that the right of tenancy is transferred from them to their heirs, spouses, and relatives up to the second degree only once after the implementation of the referred law.
The court ruling rejected the request of the plaintiff, born to an Egyptian father, to oblige the defendants to release a lease contract to her for the apartment in question that was extended to her from her non-Egyptian mother who was the original tenant.
The beneficiaries of the legal extension of the lease contract after the death or leaving of the tenant are his legitimate children, without exception.
The extension of the lease contract after the death of the tenant or his leaving of the property is in favor of his wife, children, or parents, as stipulated in Article 29/1, Law no. 49 of 1977. Its conditions are that they reside with him in a stable residence until his death or leaving, regardless of the duration or beginning of the residence.
The obligations arising from the lease contract are borne by both parties, and they may agree to arrange rights for others.
The condition for the extension of the lease contract after the death of the tenant is that the beneficiary has a stable residence with him before his death. Interruption due to a temporary impediment does not prevent the extension of the contract after the death of the tenant.
The beneficiaries of the legal extension of the lease contract replace the original tenant in it after his death or leaving the property.
The general provisions of the lease contract in civil law must be applied except for the provisions issued by special legislation, such as the extension of lease contracts for non-residential places, as stipulated in Law no. 6 of 1997.
The lease contract concluded for the purpose of practicing commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal activities continues after the death of the tenant in favor of his heirs.
Lease Contract: Non-termination upon the death of the original tenant or leaving of the leased property. Continuation for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
The lease contract is relative to its subject matter and its contracting parties. The agent contracts on behalf of the principal without disclosing at the time of contracting that he is contracting as an agent.
The general provisions of the civil law must be applied when the special law does not regulate them. The right of the tenant to remain in the leased property after the expiration of the lease term.

The right of the beneficiaries to extend the lease contract in case of the death of the tenant is derived directly from the law.
The stable residence that leads to the extension of the lease contract. Article 21 of Law no. 52 of 1969 corresponds to Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977. It refers to the intention of the resident to make the leased property a home and a place of habitual residence.
The lease contract subject to the Places Rent Law. The lawsuit requesting its cancellation or extension by law for an unspecified period is deemed incomputable. The primary court has jurisdiction to hear it.
The lease contract continues after the death of the tenant when it is concluded for commercial, industrial, or professional activities in favor of all heirs who use the property in the same activity specified in the contract. It is not required for the beneficiary to practice the activity himself. It suffices that one of the other beneficiaries or others represent him.
The lease contract for a residential property concluded in favor of a foreigner. Article 17 of Law no. 136 of 1981 limits the benefit of the legal extension of the contract to those specified in the law and under the conditions specified therein. Its effect is that only they can benefit from it, even if they hold Egyptian nationality.
The description of the property at the time of contracting is essential. If the contract is terminated or expired and a new contract is concluded between the same contracting parties, the nature of the property must be specified at the time of the last contract. The construction of buildings during the term of the previous contract. The new contract is considered applicable to a place subject to the Places Rent Law and extended for an unspecified period.
The court ruling of eviction is based on the leased property being vacant land without examining this defense as required and without responding to the argument raised by the plaintiff of the inadmissibility of the lawsuit. It is a deficiency and invalidity.
The extension of the lease contract for the benefit of the tenant’s wife, children, or parents who have a stable residence with him before his death or leaving of the property. Temporary interruption does not prevent the extension of the contract if there was a stable residence before.
The stable residence that leads to the extension of the lease contract is referred to in Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977. It refers to the intention of the resident to make the leased property a home and a place of habitual residence, which is implied and inferred by the resident.
The extension of the lease contract for the benefit of the beneficiaries after the death of the tenant or leaving of the property is subject to the condition that the contract is still in force at the time of leaving and has not been terminated by a court ruling or agreement.

The tenants’ claim before the court for the extension of the lease contract for the apartment in dispute, which they inhabited with their mother during the lifetime of their original tenant father, is supported by their documentation as evidence. This is a substantive defense.
The receipt issued by the landlord for the rent payment plus legal increase for the lease from within is considered a declaration by the tenant of this lease. The condition is that the lease from within is not used for one of the licenses authorized by the legislator without the consent of the owner.
The landlord’s statement to the tenant about the lease from within continues to be binding on the new owner without the need for acceptance or proof of the date, according to Article 30 of Law no. 49 of 1977.
The lease contract concluded for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal activities continues after the death of the tenant in favor of his heirs, starting from the date of the enforcement of Law no. 49 of 1977. The condition is that they use the property in the same activity specified in the contract during the tenant’s lifetime at the time of the extension.
The continuation of the residence of the wife and children in the leased property is verified by proving that their residence began correctly and met its conditions. The interruption of residence for a temporary reason does not prevent its continuation as long as the beneficiary has not explicitly or implicitly abandoned it by taking a position that does not leave any doubt about his intention to end the residence.
The residents who have the right to benefit from the legal extension are those who lived with the tenant and shared the leased property. They are not liable for any obligations during their participation in the leased property. Their rights under the lease relationship are transferred to them after the death of the tenant or leaving of the property.
The expiration of the ruling that negates the stable residence of the plaintiff in the disputed property with her father until his death, despite her caretaking responsibilities for her sick father, leads to the corruption of the ruling in relying on the testimony of witnesses against her. Although one of the witnesses acknowledged seeing her daily and did not deny her relationship with her father, indicating her intention to make the property her home. The court’s ruling, which affirmed the lower court’s decision that the plaintiff’s residence was temporary, is a mistake, deficiency, and corruption in reasoning.
The expiration of the ruling that was contested leads to the retroactive effect of the ruling issued on the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977 regarding the termination of the lease contract for relatives. This is not a mistake.
Those who benefit from the rented property have the right to remain in it after the death of the tenant, whether they are relatives or not, provided that they have resided in it continuously since the beginning of the lease and that it is suitable for habitation. Their right to remain in the property and benefit from the legal extension after the expiration of the lease is guaranteed.
The landlord’s commitment to draw up a lease contract for those who are entitled to replace the tenant when the conditions are met. Its effect is that the occupant of the property can rely on it to prove that the lease relationship has not ended. This is provided for in Article 152 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977.
The lease contract continues in favor of the relatives of the tenant who resided with him before his death under Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977. The customary stable residence is the intended meaning. Its effect is the dispute over the extension of the contract for those who are entitled. It can be divided.
The lease contract does not terminate upon the death of the tenant for the rented property, and it continues for the benefit of the beneficiaries under Article 29/1 of Law no. 49 of 1977. The residence that leads to the legal extension of the lease contract is intended. It refers to the stable residence until death or abandonment. The temporary and transient residence does not count. Its assessment is at the discretion of the court as long as it establishes valid reasons for its decision.
The ruling on the unconstitutionality of a non-tax or non-regulatory legal provision. Its effect is that it cannot be applied from the day following its publication in the official gazette. This withdrawal applies to previous facts and legal positions, even if the case is pending before the Court of Cassation. This is provided for in Articles 175 and 178 of the Constitution and Article 49 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law.
The ruling of the Constitutional Court on the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977 regarding the leasing and sale of property and the regulation of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee. Its effect is that the lease contract cannot be extended to the tenant’s partner. The condition is that the lease must be terminated.
The ruling of the Constitutional Court declaring the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977 regarding relatives up to the third degree of affinity. Its effect is that the legal extension of the lease contract is limited to the persons mentioned exclusively in the first paragraph of that article.
The lease contract concluded for the purpose of carrying out a commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal activity continues for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Its scope is their use of the property for the same activity that the original tenant carried out according to the contract during his lifetime at the time of the extension. Articles 1, 4, 5, 6, and 6bis of Law no. 6 of 1997 provide for the heirs’ right to change the activity, provided that it is not intended to deceive or harm the building’s safety or its occupants. “An example of a defective subletting.”

The ruling of the Constitutional Court declaring the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977 regarding relatives up to the third degree of affinity. Its effect is that the legal extension of the lease contract is limited to the persons mentioned exclusively in the first paragraph of that article. The ruling contested, which terminates the lease relationship and delivers the disputed property, has legal validity regardless of any opinion about it.
The ruling of the Constitutional Court declaring the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977 regarding relatives up to the third degree of affinity. Its effect is that the legal extension of the lease contract is limited to the persons mentioned exclusively in the first paragraph of that article. The contested ruling’s validity is not affected by any opinion about it.
The ruling of the Constitutional Court declaring the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law no. 49 of 1977 regarding relatives up to the third degree of affinity. Its effect is that the legal extension of the lease contract is limited to the persons mentioned exclusively in the first paragraph of that article.
The right of a minor to the legal extension of the lease contract is a personal right. The guardian cannot waive it without the court’s permission.
What is the legal extension of the lease contract?
The lease contract is one of the contracts of benefit governed by the general rules of contracts in general, in addition to the special rules of the lease contract stipulated in the Civil Code.
In general, a contract is the commitment of one party resulting from the acceptance of the other party and their agreement on a matter that produces an effect on the subject of the contract, and it entails the obligation of each party to fulfill what is due to the other 1.
Leasing is the granting of the lessee’s benefit from the leased property for a certain period in exchange for a known compensation 2. The subject matter of the lease is the benefit, and its delivery is achieved by delivering its place 3.
It can be inferred from the definition of the lease contract that its essential elements are: the leased property, the rent, and the duration.
It should be noted that the last two elements are interdependent, and as a result, the lease is a continuous contract, and the rent corresponds to the period of use. The lease contract is a time-limited contract because time is an essential element in it and determines the scope of the contract. It responds to the benefit, and time determines the amount of this benefit.
Therefore, specifying the duration of a lease contract is one of the essential elements of the contract. Article 658 of the Civil Code stipulates that “the lease contract is concluded for a certain period.” These provisions also require that the lease period be known and not exceed thirty years. If the lease is concluded for a longer period, it is reduced to thirty years.
If the lease contract does not specify a duration, and the contract is concluded for a specific rent per unit of time, it is automatically renewed for both parties at the end of each unit of time, and either party may terminate it at the end of each unit of time. The lease contract ends when the period specified in the contract expires, unless automatic renewal is stipulated.
When the lease period expires and is not renewed, the tenant must return the rented property to the landlord in the same condition as when he received it. If he keeps it without right, he is required to pay the equivalent rent and compensate for any damages.
If the tenant continues to use the rented property without right after the lease period has expired, he is liable to pay the rent for the period of use and compensate the landlord for any damages.
However, in 1953, the Jordanian legislator intervened to protect the tenant and enacted provisions in the Landlords and Tenants Law that depart from the general rules of contracts. The tenant was given the right to continue occupying the rented property after the end of the contractual lease period, despite any contrary agreement. This is known as the legal extension of the lease, where the lease contract continues to exist, and the rent continues to be paid under the same conditions, as long as there is no reason for eviction.
According to this article, the tenant has the right to continue occupying the rented property, even if the lease contract specifies a duration. The law is stronger than the contract.
The intervention of the legislator at that time was undoubtedly necessary to protect the tenant’s stability, given the social and economic conditions that the country was going through, which prompted the legislator to intervene to protect the tenant and ensure his stability in the property he occupies.
In 2000, under Law No. 30 of 2000, which amended Law No. 16 of 1994 concerning landlords and tenants, the legislature repealed its intervention in the will of the contracting parties with regard to contracts concluded after the new amendment went into effect. These contracts are now subject to the general provisions of contracts in general and lease contracts in particular, as stipulated by Article 5 of the law. The lease contract expires at the end of the agreed-upon period, and as a result of this amendment, there is no longer any problem with all contracts that arose or will arise after the application of the 2000 law. Citizens have become aware of the positives and negatives of the duration of the contract that they agree upon, meaning that future disputes for these contracts have been settled.

However, the law kept the protection in place for old contracts concluded before August 31, 2000, which is the date the amendment to the Landlords and Tenants Law came into effect. The tenant is obligated to occupy the rented property until December 31, 2010, and these contracts end on that date.
According to the latest amendment to the law, at the end of the lease period, the tenant is obliged to return the rented property to the landlord in accordance with Article 658 of the Civil Code. Thus, the leased property must be returned at the end of the agreed-upon period for contracts concluded after the latest amendment went into effect, or at the end of the period specified by the law, which is until December 31, 2010, or if the contract ends before its expiration due to the failure of one of the parties to fulfill their obligations or for any other reason.
However, ending all old contracts at once and on the same day, as stipulated by Article 5 of the current law, will undoubtedly have economic and social repercussions due to the disputes that will arise between the parties to the contract. These contracts are either related to the tenant’s workplace or place of residence, both of which are matters that cannot be dispensed with.
The ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court, issued on November 3, 2002, regarding the extension of residential rent to children and relatives, sparked a long debate among some columnists. There was a general sense of confusion on the one hand and fear on the other hand. The reality is that the ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court cannot be understood except in light of the rules of the conflict of laws at the time cited by the court. The best way to understand the impact of this important ruling in the history of exceptional legislation regulating residential lease contracts is to first present the problem that was presented to the court and on which the ruling was issued, and then to present how this ruling is applied to other cases in accordance with the wording and rationale of the ruling.
First: The problem that was presented to the court: As is known, it is not possible to directly resort to the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of laws and regulations. Rather, there must be a dispute before another judicial authority, and one of the parties must raise the issue of the unconstitutionality of a provision that is intended to be applied to them. If the court before which the dispute is presented finds that the argument raised is serious, it suspends the proceedings before it and allows the party who raised the argument to file a constitutional lawsuit before the Constitutional Court within three months. This is in addition to the fact that the court before which the dispute is presented has the power to refer the case to the Constitutional Court itself to consider the constitutionality of the provision that must be applied if a constitutional judgment was issued on November 3, 2002, published in Official Gazette No. 46 on November 14, 2002. In the case that was the subject of the constitutional judgment, it was an eviction lawsuit filed by the owner of an apartment rented in 1957 to the heir of a person who had died in 1969. In response to the eviction lawsuit, the heirs residing in the rented apartment filed a subsidiary lawsuit obligating the owner to execute a lease agreement based on Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which stipulates that the lease agreement for a dwelling does not expire upon the death of the lessee or their leaving the property if their spouse, children, or any of their parents who resided with them until death or leaving remain in the property.
First Paragraph: The lease agreement for a dwelling does not expire upon the death of the lessee or their leaving the property if their spouse, children, or any of their parents who resided with them until death or leaving remain in the property.
Third Paragraph: In all cases, the lessor is obliged to execute a lease agreement for those who have the right to continue occupying the property, and these occupants are bound by the terms of the lease through solidarity.
The Cairo North Primary Court rejected an eviction lawsuit and obliged the lessors to execute a lease agreement for the original tenant’s heirs in a dispute over an apartment in accordance with Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which led the lessors to file an appeal claiming the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned Article 29. When the Court of Appeal found the argument serious, it allowed the lessors to file a constitutional lawsuit before the Constitutional Court, which they did on June 27, 1996, claiming that the provision in Article 29 violates Islamic law and the Constitution, which protects private property and contradicts the principle of social solidarity.
In this case, the Constitutional Court was called upon to address the objections raised against the first and third paragraphs of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977. The Supreme Constitutional Court considered the issue from two perspectives: the first was to examine each paragraph of Article 29 separately. The second was to examine the parallel and consecutive application of both paragraphs at the same time. From the first perspective, the Supreme Constitutional Court found that the first paragraph of Article 29 of Law No. 39 of 1947 is constitutionally sound and remains valid in its original form, which stipulates that the lease agreement for a dwelling does not expire upon the death of the lessee or their leaving the property if their spouse, children, or any of their parents who resided with them until death or leaving remain in the property. The Supreme Constitutional Court also found that if the third paragraph of Article 29 is considered in isolation, it too is constitutionally sound, as its wording does not exceed the limits of the first paragraph, which the Court found to be constitutional.
Immediately and without preamble, the Constitutional Court examined the third paragraph in conjunction with the first paragraph and ruled that the text was unconstitutional because it should have included a provision stating that the lease agreement for the heirs must end when the last member of the heirs, whether by death or departure, ceases to reside in the property. The Supreme Constitutional Court justified this surprising ruling by stating that a lease agreement is by nature temporary and that applying the third paragraph without indicating the end of the contract upon the death or departure of the person for whom the contract was extended would validate the lease agreement, which violates the constitutional protection of property rights. This unexpected ruling confused interpreters and alarmed many, including the Constitutional Court itself. The court therefore used one of the exceptions allowed to it and limited its judgment to subsequent facts from the date of publication of the ruling in the Official Gazette, requiring us to determine the scope of the judgment’s application by applying the rules of conflict of laws in time.
Secondly, the application of the constitutional ruling in time requires three different solutions depending on whether each case occurred before or after November 15, 2002. The ruling issued on November 4, 2002, was published in the Official Gazette on November 14, 2002, and became effective the next day, November 15, 2002.
The first case involves children, spouses, and parents of the original tenant who died before or on November 15, 2002, and were able to obtain a new lease agreement from the landlord, which could also include grandchildren of the original tenant.
The second case is similar to the first, except that the persons residing with the original tenant were unable to obtain a new lease agreement from the landlord after his death but continue to reside in the leased property without a written agreement.
The third case involves the original tenant who was alive on November 15, 2002, and resided with his children, spouse, and parents, and these persons continued to reside in the property after his death or departure after November 15, 2002, even if it was only one day.
The Constitutional Court’s ruling established that all contracts concluded before November 15, 2002, were subject to the third paragraph of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977. Therefore, all contracts that should have been executed under this paragraph but were not are considered valid and remain in effect, producing all their legal effects, according to the text of the third paragraph of Article 29.
This means that in the first case, where the children and spouses residing in the property have obtained a new lease agreement, they can continue to reside in the property, and their children, spouses, and parents can benefit from the extension of the lease agreement, just as if the Constitutional Court had not issued its ruling.
The same rule applies to the second case, where the residents were unable to obtain a new lease agreement after the death of the original tenant before November 15, 2002, which means that there is a notional contract, as expressed by the Constitutional Court as a contractual judgment, and these residents can continue to benefit from the legal extension of the lease agreement as stated in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 in its version before the Constitutional ruling took effect on November 15, 2002.

As for the third case, where the ruling applies immediately and directly, even if the original tenant was alive and residing in the leased property with his children, spouse, and parents on November 15, 2002, whether he continued living there after that date or left the property to his children, spouse, and parents who were residing with him on that date, these individuals can continue to reside but cannot inherit the lease agreement.
They can only benefit from the legal extension of the lease agreement until their death or departure, but their children or grandchildren cannot inherit the lease agreement. Therefore, if we have a son, daughter, spouse, and mother living in the leased property at the time of the original tenant’s death, which occurs after November 15, 2002, all of them have the right to continue residing in the property. However, if any of them die and have children or spouses, these children or spouses, who belong to the second generation, cannot benefit from the legal extension of the lease agreement.
This means that the legal extension of the contract is limited to the first generation who remain alive after the death of the original tenant, and the second generation, which includes the children and spouses of the first generation, cannot benefit from it. This is our interpretation of the Constitutional ruling on the non-inheritance of lease agreements, and opinions may differ regarding the fairness or appropriateness of the solutions provided by the ruling. However, it necessitates the intervention of the legislature to enact a comprehensive legislation that is compatible with the social conditions and structural developments of Egyptian society and is consistent with the rules regulating the inheritance of leases of non-residential places as provided by Law No. 6 of 1997.
Summary of the Rule:
According to the provisions of Law No. 49 of 1977, the lease agreement for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal use extends to the heirs of the original tenant after their death for the same activity that the original tenant was engaged in before their death. This is necessary to maintain financial and commercial circulation.
The first article of Law No. 6 of 1997 amends Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 regarding the lease and sale of places and the regulation of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee. It states that if the property is leased for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal use, the lease agreement does not expire upon the death of the tenant and extends to their heirs for the same activity that the original tenant was engaged in before their death. The lessor is required to prepare a lease agreement for the heirs, and the right to lease is transferred to them by law. They have the right to use the leased property with the same rights that the original tenant had.
According to Article 18 (d) of Law No. 136 of 1981, the lessee has the right to change the way the leased property is used as long as it does not cause damage to the building, public health, or violate public morals. Thus, it is permissible for the heirs to change the activity they were engaged in before the death of the original tenant, as long as it does not violate the law or cause damage to the building or public health.
Session April 22, 2001
Appeal No. 1633 of 1970 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:
According to Article 18 of Law No. 136 of 1981, the lessee has the right to change the way that the leased property is used under certain conditions. It is permissible for the heirs of the original tenant, who are covered by the lease agreement under the law, to change the activity that the deceased tenant engaged in before their death, as long as the lessor cannot prove that this change was made to circumvent the law or causes damage to the building or public health.
The Rule:
The text of the first article of Law No. 6 of 1997, which amends the second paragraph of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, was found unconstitutional in Appeal No. 44 of 1997 on July 22, 1997. Some provisions of the law concerning the lease of non-residential premises, which were published on March 16, 1997, in Official Gazette No. 10, state that “the following text shall replace the second paragraph of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 regarding the lease and sale of places and the regulation of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee: If the property is leased for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal use, the lease agreement does not expire upon the death of the tenant and extends to their heirs for the same activity that the original tenant was engaged in before their death according to the contract…”. This indicates that, starting from the date of implementation of the provisions of Law No. 49 of 1977, the lease contract for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal use extends to the heirs of the original tenant covered by the law, who can use the property for the same activity that the original tenant engaged in according to the contract during their lifetime. This is considered necessary by the legislator to maintain financial and commercial circulation, and the lessor must prepare a lease agreement for them. The right to lease is transferred to them by law, and they have the right to use the leased property with the same rights as the original tenant. Since the lessee has the right under Article 18 (d) of Law No. 136 of 1981 to change the way the leased property is used as long as it does not cause damage to the building, public health, or violate public morals, the heirs of the original tenant covered by the law can change the activity they were engaged in before the death of the original tenant, provided that the lessor cannot prove that this change was made to circumvent the law or causes damage to the building or public health.
Session April 11, 2001
Appeal No. 1726 of 1969 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:

The lease agreement for a residential property extends to the beneficiaries – the wife, children, and either parent – if their residence in the property was stable until the date of the tenant’s death or departure.
The Rule:
It is established – in the jurisdiction of this court – that the text in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which states that “without prejudice to the provisions of this law, the lease agreement for a residential property does not expire upon the death of the tenant or their departure if their wife, children, or either parent who were residing with them until their death or departure…” indicates that the lease agreement for a residential property does not expire for these beneficiaries upon the death of the original tenant or their departure, and the lease relationship continues with any of the beneficiaries mentioned as long as their residence in the property was stable until the date of the tenant’s death or departure.
In the case reviewed by the court, the appeal challenged the ruling that the appellant was not entitled to the legal extension of the disputed apartment because she was outside the country during her mother’s death, and her defense was ignored. However, the court found shortcomings in the reasoning of the ruling that require its reversal.
The court found that the appellant had argued before the lower court for the extension of the lease agreement for the disputed property in her favor due to her stable residence with her original tenant father until his death. The appealed ruling determined that “… the facts of the case indicate that the original tenant, who has passed away, left his deceased wife, who became an original tenant by his death, in the disputed apartment. The testimony of the appellant’s witnesses in the original lawsuit, which was supported by official documents, denied that the claimant resided with her deceased mother in the disputed apartment before her death until May 6, 1997. The established fact from the movement certificate is that she was not inside the country on the date of her mother’s death on May 6, 1997, and was in the Libyan Republic since March 15, 1996, and did not return to the country until after the death on June 11, 1997. Therefore, the condition of the lease agreement extension for her mother to her had not been met, which was her stable residence with her in the disputed apartment before her death until May 6, 1997, and the lease agreement had expired upon her mother’s death. Thus, her possession of the property after that was merely a matter of possession without legal basis…”. The court found that the appealed ruling did not address the appellant’s defense of the extension of the lease agreement for the disputed property in her favor due to her stable residence with her original tenant father until his death, which is a substantive defense that may change if it is true. Therefore, the reasoning in the appealed ruling suffered from shortcomings that require its reversal.
Session November 25, 2001

Appeal No. 4476 of 1965 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:
The provision in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which extends the lease agreement to relatives of the tenant up to the third degree – as stated in the law – is unconstitutional.
The Rule:
The appealed ruling that obligated the appellants to rent a property to the respondent for a period exceeding one year due to her stable residence with her tenant aunt in the disputed property, was based on the provision in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977. However, the Supreme Constitutional Court had previously ruled in its decision published on August 14, 1997, in case No. 116 of 1998 “Constitutional”, that the provision in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which extends the lease agreement to relatives of the tenant up to the third degree, is unconstitutional. Therefore, the appealed ruling that relied on the provision that has been deemed unconstitutional violated the law and must be overturned.
Session April 18, 2001
Appeal No. 1813 of 1969 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:
The lease agreement for a commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal property extends to the heirs of the tenant if they continue to use the property for the same purpose as the original tenant according to the contract during their lifetime.
The Rule:
The text in the first article of Law No. 6 of 1997, which amended the second paragraph of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, states that “If the property is leased for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal purposes, the lease agreement does not expire upon the death of the tenant and continues for the benefit of their heirs who continue to use the property for the same purpose as the original tenant according to the contract during their lifetime, including spouses and relatives up to the second degree, regardless of gender and age, whether they use the property themselves or through a representative.” indicates that the lease agreement for a commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal property extends to the heirs of the tenant if they continue to use the property for the same purpose as the original tenant according to the contract during their lifetime. This is necessary to maintain financial and commercial stability, as intended by the legislator.
Session April 11, 2001
Appeal No. 2260 of 1965 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:
The lease agreement continues and extends in case of the death of the tenant or the transfer of the leased property to their spouse, children, or parents, provided that they prove their residence with the tenant until their death or transfer – the nature of the residence relied upon and its reality – transient and temporary residency does not count regardless of its duration or reasons.
The Rule:
It is established – in this court’s jurisdiction – that the wording of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which states that “the lease agreement for a dwelling does not expire upon the death of the tenant or the transfer of the leased property to their spouse, children, or parents who resided with the tenant until their death or transfer…” indicates that the legislator intended to protect the occupants of the leased premises and to solve the housing crisis. The article introduces a provision that allows for the continuation and extension of the lease agreement in case of the death of the tenant or the transfer of the leased property to the beneficiaries mentioned in the text, provided that they prove their residence with the tenant until their death or transfer. In this sense, residence refers to settled and customary residence, with the intention of making this dwelling their home and sustenance, so that they do not rely on any other permanent and stable shelter. Therefore, transient and temporary residency does not count regardless of its duration or reasons.
Session April 11, 2001
Appeal No. 2260 of 1965 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:
The court of the subject has the authority to assess and determine the stability of residence based on the evidence, including witness statements, as long as it has established justifiable reasons.
The Rule:
It is established that the court of the subject has the authority to assess and determine the stability of residence and whether it is settled based on the evidence, including witness statements, as long as it has established justifiable reasons. However, this is subject to the condition that what has been determined is justifiable and does not contradict the established facts in the case documents and leads to the outcome reached.
Session November 21, 2001
Appeal No. 205 of 1971 (Judicial)
Summary of the Rule:
The lease agreement continues and extends in favor of the beneficiaries specified in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, subject to certain conditions, including settled residence with the tenant or as per the law, and no interruption in residence due to any temporary circumstances. The court has the authority to assess and determine the stability of residence based on evidence, but the reasons for the judgment must be justifiable and not based on invalid evidence or a misinterpretation of the established facts.

The Rule:
It is established that the court’s reasons for judgment are considered corrupt if they are based on invalid evidence or a misinterpretation of the established facts. The wording of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 indicates that the legislator intended to protect occupants of leased premises and solve the housing crisis by introducing a provision that allows for the continuation and extension of the lease agreement in case of the death of the tenant or the transfer of the leased property to the beneficiaries mentioned in the text, provided that they prove their settled residence with the tenant or as per the law. The stability of residence can be assessed by the court based on evidence, but this is subject to the condition that the evidence is justifiable and leads to the outcome reached. Temporary interruptions in residence due to unforeseen circumstances do not count.
Session of November 21, 2001
Appeal number 205 for the year 71 (judicial)
Summary of the rule:
The judge cannot infer the existence of a permanent residence that would extend a lease contract, unless such inference is lawful and has been subject to substantive defense by the litigants. Otherwise, the judgment would be defective due to shortcomings.
The rule:
It is established in this court that a judgment is deemed corrupt in reasoning if it is based on evidence that is objectively invalid, or if the court’s understanding of the factual elements on which it relies is flawed, or if there is a contradiction between these elements. Also, if the court infers evidence that does not logically lead to its conclusion, or distorts the material facts of the case by some of the documents or decides on the basis of facts that are not established by the documents submitted, then its judgment is defective in terms of the established documents.
Therefore, given the text of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 and the interpretation of this court, the legislator aimed to protect tenants of rented properties and to solve the housing crisis by enacting a provision that provides for the continuation and extension of a lease contract in the event of the tenant’s death, or if the leased property is left to the wife or children or parents who have established residence with the tenant before his death or departure. In this case, the term “residence” means a permanent residence with the tenant or with those to whom the contract extends by virtue of the law. The absence of such residence does not preclude the extension of the lease if the person in question has not expressly or implicitly indicated an intention to abandon it. Although the judge of the case has the power to assess the evidence and examine the documents in the lawsuit and draw the correct conclusions, this is subject to the condition that such assessment is lawful and leads to the conclusion reached, and that each litigant has had the opportunity to present substantive defense. Otherwise, the judgment would be defective due to shortcomings.
Session of March 29, 2001
Appeal No. 1312 of 1965 (Judicial)
Summary of the ruling:
The court ruled the second paragraph of article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 unconstitutional in its provision allowing the continuation of the original tenant’s partners who conducted commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal activities in the leased property to carry on with the same activity. The impact of this ruling on the pending appeals before the Court of Cassation is discussed.
The Rule:
The court decided that the Court of Cassation, as well as the parties and the Public Prosecutor, are entitled to raise reasons related to public policy even if they were not previously raised before the court of first instance or in the appeal documents, provided that the reasons are based on the facts and documents presented to the court of first instance and are related to the part of the ruling being appealed. The provisions of article 49 of the Law of the Supreme Constitutional Court No. 48 of 1979, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 168 of 1998, stipulate that the rulings and interpretations of the Supreme Constitutional Court in constitutional lawsuits are binding on all state authorities and individuals. If a provision of a law or regulation is declared unconstitutional, it shall not be applied from the day following the publication of the ruling, unless the ruling specifies another date. However, a ruling declaring a tax provision unconstitutional does not have a direct effect in all cases. This indicates that a ruling declaring a provision of a non-tax law or regulation unconstitutional requires the same treatment. Based on the court’s ruling, it is not permissible to apply a provision of a law declared unconstitutional from the day following its publication, as long as the lawsuit was pending before the Court of Cassation and the issue is related to public policy, which the court should address on its own initiative.
In the present case, the Supreme Constitutional Court had previously ruled in case No. 4 of 1996, published in the Official Gazette No. 28 on July 28, 1996, that the second paragraph of article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 regarding the lease and sale of places and the relationship between the lessor and the lessee was unconstitutional insofar as it allowed the continuation of the original tenant’s partners who conducted commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal activities in the leased property to carry on with the same activity. Consequently, this provision of the law is unconstitutional and cannot be applied, effective from the day following the publication of the ruling in the Official Gazette. This means that the lease agreement does not continue in favor of the original tenant’s partners who carry on with the same activity after vacating the leased property, based on the provisions of article 29(2) of Law No. 49 of 1977. The appellant had relied on this provision when requesting proof of the lease relationship between him and the respondents regarding the disputed property. As the court ruled that this provision is unconstitutional, the ruling is flawed and should be overturned on this ground related to public policy, without the need to examine all the reasons for the appeal.
Session on November 14, 2001
Appeal No. 2515 for the year 69 (judicial)
Rule Summary:
Extension of a lease agreement for the benefit of the wife, children, and parents who reside with the original tenant until death or departure is permissible by law. The agreement can extend to others if the original tenant’s lease extends to them.
Rule:
It is determined in this court that the text in Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which states that “the lease agreement for the dwelling does not terminate upon the death of the tenant or their departure if their wife, children, or parents who resided with them until their death or departure remain in the property,” indicates that the lease for the dwelling does not terminate upon the death or departure of the original tenant – or the person to whom the lease has been extended – and the lease relationship continues with any of the beneficiaries mentioned in the text as long as their residency in the property is stable until the date of death or departure. If the residency conditions are met, the lease is extended by law. Furthermore, neglecting to consider a defense presented by the opposing party may result in the judgment being nullified if the defense is essential and has an impact on the court’s decision. Neglecting to consider such a defense constitutes a deficiency in the real reasons for the judgment. Therefore, if the court is presented with a defense, it must assess its seriousness. If the defense is deemed serious, the court must examine its effect on the lawsuit. If it fails to do so, its judgment is deficient.
Session on November 25, 2001
Appeal No. 4875 for the year 61 (judicial)
Rule Summary:
The ruling of the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, which allows for the continuation of the lease agreement for the tenant’s relatives up to the third degree of kinship, does not permit the application of the provision as long as the lawsuit was brought to the attention of the court during the appeal before the Court of Cassation.
Rule:
According to Article 49 of Law No. 48 of 1998, “the provisions of the Constitutional Court in constitutional cases and its decisions on interpretation are binding on all authorities of the state and all people.” The immediate effect of a ruling of unconstitutionality is that the provision cannot be applied from the date of the judgment’s publication. The obligation to refrain from applying the provision extends to all lawsuits brought before the courts, even if they were filed before the judgment was issued. Any other opinion is considered a limitation on the provision’s applicability and a deviation from its explicit wording. The unconstitutionality ruling revealed that a defect had existed in the provision since its inception, which rendered it invalid from its inception and negated its ability to arrange any effect from the date of the provision’s implementation. The original judgment, which extended the lease agreement to the appellant, was affirmed. The Constitutional Court had ruled in Appeal No. 116 of 1997 that Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 was unconstitutional because it permitted the continuation of the lease agreement for the tenant’s relatives up to the third degree of kinship. Therefore, the provision cannot be applied as long as the lawsuit was brought to the attention of the court during the appeal before the Court of Cassation. Failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a violation of the law, rendering the judgment void.
Session of March 21, 2001
Appeal No. 2789 for the year 69 (judicial)
Summary of the rule:
It is not permissible to evict a tenant who is occupying a property under a lease agreement without the original tenant’s consent, for non-residential purposes, if the occupant afterwards changes the activity that was being carried out by the original tenant’s heir before their death, as long as the property was being used for the same activity that the original tenant was carrying out according to the lease agreement at the time of their death, except if this change was made to circumvent the provisions of the law or if it caused harm to the safety of the building or its occupants – for that reason.
The rule or provision referred to in this text is the second paragraph of article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977, as amended by Law No. 6 of 1997. This provision relates to the rental of non-residential properties and stipulates that if the property is rented for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal purposes, the lease agreement does not terminate upon the death of the tenant and continues to benefit those who use the property for the same activity as the original tenant according to the contract.
The law also states that its provisions apply to leased properties that are not for residential purposes and are governed by Law No. 49 of 1977 and Law No. 136 of 1981, among other laws. It further requires that the law be published in the official gazette and come into effect the day after its publication, except for the first paragraph of the first article, which comes into effect from the date the Law No. 49 of 1977 takes effect.
The second article of the executive regulations of Law No. 6 of 1997, issued by Presidential Decree No. 237 of 1997, states that the regulations apply to non-residential leased properties governed by Laws No. 49 of 1977 and No. 136 of 1981 and other laws related to property rental issued before them. The fourth article of the regulations states that the provisions of the first chapter of the regulations come into effect from September 9, 1977. The seventh article of the regulations provides that for the lease agreement to continue in favor of the heirs, they must use the property for the same activity as the original tenant according to the contract.
Based on the court’s ruling, it is clear that, starting from the date when Law No. 49 of 1977 takes effect, the lease agreement for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal properties extends to the heirs specified in the first article of Law No. 6 of 1997, so long as they use the property for the same activity as the original tenant according to the contract at the time of his/her death. The lessor must then issue a new lease agreement, and the heirs have the right to enjoy the leased property with the same rights as the original tenant. However, the court emphasized that the eviction of the leased property is subject to the availability of damage and its proof, according to Article 18 of Law No. 136 of 1981. Therefore, the court’s ruling, which terminated the lease agreement for the property in question, was erroneous in both its interpretation of the law and its failure to establish the necessity of its termination.
A lease agreement for a residential property with a family character is one in which the tenant contracts to reside in it with their family members and those who are deemed to be housed by them.
Upon the death of the tenant or their leaving the property, the lease agreement extends in favor of their wife, children, or parents who reside with them permanently. This provision is governed by Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 and applies whether the deceased or the leaver was an original tenant or someone for whom the lease agreement extends by law.
The heirs of the original tenant must fulfill the conditions specified in Article 1/1 of Law No. 6 of 1997 to benefit from the extension of the lease agreement. The effect of this is that the right to lease transfers from them to their heirs, including spouses and relatives up to the second degree, once the law in question is enforced.
The court ruled that Article 29/3 of Law No. 49 of 1977 is unconstitutional insofar as it does not provide for the termination of the lease agreement that the lessor is obliged to release for those who have the right to occupy the property after the end of the last person’s stay there, whether due to death or leaving.
The beneficiaries of the extension of the lease agreement after the death or leaving of the tenant are the children of the tenant who are legitimate – no others.
The lease agreement extends after the death of the tenant or their leaving the property in favor of their spouse, children, or parents. This provision is governed by Article 29/1 of Law No. 49 of 1977 and applies as long as they resided with the tenant permanently until their death or leaving, regardless of the duration or start of their stay.

The obligations arising from the lease agreement fall on both parties, and they may agree to arrange rights for others.
The extension of the lease agreement after the death of the tenant is subject to the condition that the beneficiary resided with the tenant permanently before their death. The interruption due to a temporary cause does not prevent the extension of the lease agreement after the death of the tenant.
The beneficiaries of the legal extension of the lease agreement are to take the place of the original tenant upon their death or leaving the property.
The general provisions of the lease agreement in the Civil Law must be applied, except for the provisions issued by special legislation, such as the extension of lease agreements for non-residential properties governed by Law No. 6 of 1997.
The lease agreement concluded for commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal purposes continues after the death of the tenant in favor of their heirs.
Lease agreement: Non-termination upon the death of the original tenant or their vacating the leased property, and its continuation for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
The effect of the lease agreement depends on its subject matter and parties. The agent may contract on behalf of the principal without disclosing their agency status at the time of contracting.
The general provisions of the law must be applied in the absence of specific regulations. The right of the tenant to remain in the leased property after the end of the lease period.
The right of beneficiaries to extend the lease agreement in case of the tenant’s death is directly derived from the law.
The permanent residence that leads to the extension of the lease agreement is defined in Law No. 21 of 1969, corresponding to Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977. It refers to the resident’s intention to make the leased property their home and habitual residence.
The lease agreement subject to the Places Rent Law cannot be terminated or extended by law for an unspecified period. It is considered of an indeterminate value. The primary court has jurisdiction over such cases.
The lease agreement for commercial, industrial, or professional purposes continues after the tenant’s death. It extends to all heirs who use the property for the same activity specified in the agreement, without requiring the beneficiary to conduct the activity themselves. It is sufficient for one of the beneficiaries or others to act on their behalf.
The lease agreement for a residential property with a foreigner is governed by Law No. 17 of 1981, Article 136. The benefit of the legal extension of the agreement is limited to those explicitly named in the law and subject to the specified conditions. It results in only those named benefiting, even if they hold Egyptian nationality.

The description of the leased property at the time of contracting is crucial. Termination or expiration of the agreement and the conclusion of a new contract between the same parties require specifying the nature of the property at the time of the new contract. The construction of buildings during the previous lease agreement is considered in the new agreement, which extends to an unspecified period.
The court ruling to evict the tenant’s property was based on the assumption that the leased property was vacant land, without examining the defense adequately and without addressing the counter-argument raised by the tenant. The ruling was deficient and invalid.